Secure Quantum Private Comparison of Equality Based on Asymmetric W
  State by Liu, Wen-Jie et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
31
2.
55
77
v1
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  1
9 D
ec
 20
13
Noname manuscript No.
(will be inserted by the editor)
Secure Quantum Private Comparison of Equality
Based on Asymmetric W State
Wen-Jie Liu · Chao Liu · Hai-bin
Wang · Jing-Fa Liu · Fang Wang ·
Xiao-Min Yuan
Received: date / Accepted: date
Abstract Recently, Liu et al. [Opt. Commun. 284, 3160, 2011] proposed a
protocol for quantum private comparison of equality (QPCE) based on sym-
metric W state. However, Li et al. [Eur. Phys. J. D. 66, 110, 2012] pointed
out that there is a flaw of information leak, and they proposed a new protocol
based on EPR pairs. While examining these two protocols, we find that there
exists a same flaw: the third party (TP) can know the comparison result. In
this paper, through introducing and constructing a special class of asymmet-
ric W state, a secure QPCE protocol based on this asymmetric W state is
presented. Analysis shows the present protocol can not only effectively avoid
the information leak found by Li et al, but also ensure TP would not get any
information about the comparison result.
Keywords Quantum cryptography · Quantum private comparison of
equality · Asymmetric W state · Information leak
1 Introduction
Secure multi-party computation (SMC) is an important and fundamental
branch in cryptographic field, and it deals with computing a function in a
distributed network where each participant holds one of the secret inputs, and
guarantees no information about one participants secret inputs is leaked to
others. In the scientific computation, comparison is a basic problem, so the
private comparison is an important issue in SMC, and well-studied in classical
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cryptography. In 1982, Yao [1] proposed a famous protocol for the million-
aires’ problem, in which two millionaires wish to know who is richer without
revealing the precise amount of their fortunes. Following the idea of Yao’s
millionaires’ problem, Boudot et al. [2] subsequently proposed a protocol to
decide whether two millionaires are equally rich or not. Since then, the private
comparison has drawn more and more attentions [3-5]. However, the security
of classical private comparison is based on the computation complexity, which
is susceptible to the strong ability of quantum computation. Unlike classical
private comparison, the security of quantum private comparison relies on the
laws of physics, such as the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, the quantum no-
cloning theorem, rather than computational assumptions. So, quantum private
comparison is able to guarantee the unconditional security of the information
by quantum mechanics.
The first protocol for quantum private comparison of equality (QPCE)
was proposed by Yang et al. [6] in 2009, in which a one-way hash function
was used to calculate the hash values of two participants’ secret inputs firstly,
and then these hash values were encoded into the photons of EPR pairs. In
essence, its security is guaranteed by the hash function. Since then, many other
QPCE protocols have been proposed, such as the QPCE protocols with non-
entangled state (i.e., single photon) [7, 8], the QPCE protocols with maximally
entangled state (Bell state, GHZ state, etc.) [9-13], and the QPCE protocols
with non-maximally entangled state (W state, cluster state, χ-type state, etc.)
[14-18]. Recently, Liu et al. [18] proposed an efficient QPCE protocol with
three-particle symmetric W state 1√
3
(|100〉+ |010〉+ |001〉) (referred to as the
LWJ11 protocol hereafter). To our knowledge, this is the only one that utilized
W state as quantum resource in the QPCE protocol. Unfortunately, in 2012, Li
et al. [19] pointed out that a flaw of information leak is existent in the LWJ11
protocol: one participant can estimate the other’s private bit successfully with
probability 2/3, rather than 1/2. Subsequently, they presented a new protocol
with EPR pairs (referred to as the LWG12 protocol hereafter). Thus, strictly
speaking, there has been no secure QPCE protocol based on W state to be
published by far. On the other hand, we find that there exists a same flaw
in the LWJ11 and LWG12 protocols, i.e., the third party (TP) can know the
comparison result, which is contrary to what they claimed: “TP cannot know
the comparison result”.
In this paper, we aim to propose a secure QPCE protocol based on W
state to avoid all of these flaws discussed above. Firstly, we introduce a special
class of asymmetric W state, and give its construction framework from the
perspective of quantum reversible logic circuits. And then, by utilizing the
W states, a new secure QPCE protocol is presented. The new protocol not
only holds the same efficiency as the LWJ11 protocol, but also avoids the
information leak pointed out in Ref. [19]. What is more, the present protocol
can ensure TP cannot know any information about the comparison result,
which avoids the flaw existent in the LWJ11 and LWG12 protocols.
The structure of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly
review and analyze the LWJ11 and LWG12 protocols. In Section 3, the asym-
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metric W state is introduced, and a new secure QPCE protocol is proposed.
And the security of the present protocol is analyzed in Section 3, and a brief
discussion and conclusion is given finally in Section 4.
2 Review of the LWJ11 and LWG12 protocols and their flaw
2.1 Review of the LWJ11 and LWG12 protocols
In Ref. [18], Liu et al. proposed a QPCE protocol based on symmetricW state.
In the protocol, Alice and Bob are supposed as two participants, who have the
secret inputs X =
∑N−1
i=0 xi2
i, Y =
∑N−1
i=0 yi2
i, respectively, where xi, yi ∈
{0, 1}, 2N−1 ≤ max{X,Y } ≤ 2N . Obviously, the binary representations of
X and Y are (x0, x1, ..., xN−1), (y0, y1, ..., yN−1), respectively. And the main
procedures of the LWJ11 protocol are as follows,
Step 1. Alice and TP (Bob and TP), use a QKD protocol to establish
a common secret key KAC (KBC). Alice and Bob agree that |01〉, |10〉, |1〉
(|00〉, |0〉) represent information ‘1’ (‘0’).
Step 2. Alice (Bob) prepares N symmetric W states, each of which is
randomly chosen from |φ1〉 = 1√
3
(|100〉+ |010〉+ |001〉)123, |φ2〉 = 1√
3
(|10+〉+
|01+〉+|00−〉)123. Then Alice (Bob) performs iσy = |0〉〈1|−|1〉〈0| operation on
the third photon of ithW state when xi = 1 (yi = 1), where i = 0, 1, . . . , N−1.
After that, Alice (Bob) prepares N
′
W states from one of the two states
|φ1〉, |φ2〉 randomly, and inserts them into her (his) N W states at the same
positions. Then Alice and Bob exchange the third photons of all W states
and remain the other photons on hand. Subsequently, Alice (Bob) announces
publicly the N +N
′
initial states prepared by her (him). If the initial state is
|φ2〉, Bob (Alice) performs a Hadamard operation (H) on the third photons
arrived from Alice (Bob).
H =
1√
2
(|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈0|+ |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈1|), (1)
Otherwise, he (she) does nothing. Finally, Alice and Bob take out those 2N
′
W states and perform the eavesdropping checking, respectively. The detailed
procedures are omitted here.
Step 3. If there is no eavesdropper, Alice (Bob) makes single-particle mea-
surement in the Z-basis{|0〉, |1〉} on every photon on her (his) hand. The mea-
surement outcome about the first and second photons of every W state pre-
pared by Alice (Bob) is denoted by MA1i (M
B1
i ). If M
A1
i (M
B1
i ) is |01〉 or
|10〉, then CA1i (CB1i ) = 1; if MA1i (MB1i ) is |00〉, then CA1i (CB1i ) = 0. And the
outcome about the third photons of every W states prepared by Alice (Bob)
is represented as MA2i (M
B2
i ). When M
A2
i (M
B2
i ) is |0〉, then CA2i (CB2i ) = 0;
When MA2i (M
B2
i ) is |1〉, then CA2i (CB2i ) = 1. Finally, Alice (Bob) calculates
CAi = C
A1
i ⊕ CB2i , (CBi = CB1i ⊕ CA2i ), and gets CA = (CA0 , CA1 , . . . , CAN−1)
(CB = (C
B
0 , C
B
1 , . . . , C
B
N−1)). Here i = 0, 1, · · ·N − 1.
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Step 4. Alice (Bob) prepares an L-length random sequence CA′ = (C
A
′
0 , C
A
′
1
, . . . , CA
′
L−1) (CB′ = (C
B
′
0 , C
B
′
1 , . . . , C
B
′
L−1)), where C
A
′
i , C
B
′
i ∈ {0, 1}, i =
0, 1, . . . , L − 1, and sends CA′ (CB′ ) to Bob (Alice). Alice inserts CA′ into
CA to get CA′′ and sends the inserted positions sequence Sq to Bob. Bob in-
serts CB′ into CB in terms of Sq to get CB′′ . Then Alice and Bob use KAC ,
KBC to encrypt CA′′ , CB′′ , get E(CA′′ ), E(CB′′ ), respectively, and send both
of them to TP.
Step 5. After using KAC , KBC to decrypt E(CA′′ ), E(CB′′ ) and getting
CA′′ , CB′′ , TP calculates R
′
=
∑N−1
i=0 (C
A
i ⊕ CBi ) +
∑L−1
i=0 (C
A
′
i ⊕ CB
′
i ), and
he sends R
′
to Alice and Bob.
Step 6. After receiving CA′ , CB′ , R
′
, Alice and Bob calculate R = R
′ −∑L−1
i=0 (C
A
′
i ⊕ CB
′
i ), respectively. If R = 0, they know X = Y ; otherwise,
X 6= Y .
In Ref. [19], Li et al. pointed out that a flaw of information leak is existent
in the LWJ11 protocol, that is, a participant can estimate the other’s every
private information correctly with probability 2/3. Then they proposed a new
protocol using EPR pairs instead of the original symmetric W states. The
whole protocol consists of six steps, whose main procedures are similar as
those of LWJ11 protocol. The major modification is as follows,
(i) In the whole protocol, the EPR pairs |ϕ+〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 + |10〉) are utilized
as information carrier instead of the original W states.
(ii) In order to save quantum bits, decoy photons, rather than entangled W
states, are utilized to perform eavesdropping checking.
2.2 The flaw
In order to prevent TP from getting the comparison result, a mix-up solution
is used in both of the LWJ11 and LWG12 protocols. More specifically, as
depicted in Step 4, Alice (Bob) prepares the random sequence CA′ (CB′ ), and
sends it to Bob (Alice). Then Alice inserts CA′ into CA, and gets CA′′ . At the
same time, Bob inserts CB′ into CB at the same positions in terms of Alice’s
notification, and gets CB′′ . For simplicity, we denote CA′′ , CB′′ as below,
CA′′ = CA‖CA′ , CB′′ = CB‖CB′ (‘‖’ denotes the collection of two sequences).
Subsequently, CA′′ and CB′′ will be sent to TP by utilizing QKD method in
Step 4. And then, TP calculates the bit-wise exclusive-OR operation between
CA′′ and CB′′ , and gets R
′
=
∑N−1
i=0 (C
A
i ⊕CBi ) +
∑L−1
i=0 (C
A
′
i ⊕CB
′
i ). On the
surface, TP only know the result of R
′
rather than R =
∑N−1
i=0 (C
A
i ⊕CBi ), so
he cannot know the comparison result.
But unfortunately, that is just not the case. As we all know, the classical
information transmitted through public channel can be arbitrarily obtained
without being detected. Since CA′ , CB′ and Sq are sent through the classical
channel in Step 4, that means TP can obtain them without be detected. There
are two ways for TP to gain the comparison result. (1) TP calculates R
′′
=
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Fig. 1: The quantum circuit framework generating the |W1〉 state.
∑L−1
i=0 (C
A
′
i ⊕CB
′
i ) according to CA′ and CB′ , and gets the result by calculating
R = R
′ − R′′ . (2) TP gets rid of the mix-up sequences CA′ , CB′ from CA′′ ,
CB′′ , respectively, and obtains CA, CB according to the position sequence Sq,
and then he calculates R =
∑N−1
i=0 (C
A
i ⊕ CBi ) to get the comparison result.
In a word, TP can gain the comparison result, which is contrary to what they
claimed: “TP cannot know the comparison result”.
3 The proposed protocol based on asymmetric W state
3.1 The asymmetric W state and its quantum circuits construction
Unlike the maximally entangled state, theW state has some nice entanglement
properties, it is maximally robust under disposal of any one of the three qubits.
The class of states |Wn〉 is such one [20],
|Wn〉 = 1√
2 + 2n
(|100〉+√neiγ |010〉+√n+ 1eiδ|001〉)123, (2)
where n is a real number, γ and δ are phases. As we shall see, the asymmetric
states can be used for perfect superdense coding in our protocol. In particular,
if we take n = 1 for simplicity and set phases to zero (i.e., γ = 0, δ = 0), then
the |W1〉 state can be gotten,
|W1〉 = 1
2
(|100〉+ |010〉+
√
2|001〉)123. (3)
From the perspective of quantum reversible logic circuits [21], we design a
framework of quantum circuit by using NOT gate, controlled-NOT (CNOT)
gate and Hadamard gate to construct the asymmetric W state |W1〉. The
detailed circuit representation is shown in Fig. 1.
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3.2 The QPCE protocol based on asymmetric W state
In order to avoid the flaw of information leak which Li et al. pointed out, as
well as prevent TP from getting the comparison result, we present a secure
QPCE protocol based on asymmetric W state, and the detailed procedures
are as below.
Prerequisite. Alice and Bob use a QKD protocol to establish two common
secret keysKAB; Alice and TP (Bob and TP) getKAT (KBT ) in the same way.
Alice and Bob agree that |01〉, |10〉, |1〉 represent the information ‘1’; |00〉, |0〉
represent the information ‘0’.
Step 1. Alice and Bob prepare an ordered N three-qubit asymmetric W
states sequence, respectively, which are called SA, SB,{
SA = [P
A1
1 , P
A2
1 , P
A3
1 , P
A1
2 , P
A2
2 , P
A3
2 , . . . , P
A1
N , P
A2
N , P
A3
N ]
SB = [P
B1
1 , P
B2
1 , P
B3
1 , P
B1
2 , P
B2
2 , P
B3
2 , . . . , P
B1
N , P
B2
N , P
B3
N ].
(4)
Here, the subscripts 1, 2, ..., N indicate the orders of W states in the sequence
and superscripts A1, A2, A3(B1, B2, B3) represent three different particles in
one W state. And each W state is chosen from {|W1〉, |W ′1〉} randomly.
|W1〉 = 1
2
(|100〉+ |010〉+
√
2|001〉)123, (5)
|W ′1〉 =
1
2
(|10+〉+ |01+〉+
√
2|00−〉)123. (6)
Then Alice (Bob) perform unitary operation I or σx on the third photon of ith
W state in terms of her (his) secret inputs (x0, x1, ..., xN−1) ((y0, y1, ..., yN−1)).
If xi = 1(yi = 1), Alice (Bob) performs σx = |0〉〈1| + |1〉〈0| operation; other-
wise, she (he) performs I = |0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1| operation, where i = 0, 1, . . . , N −1.
After that, Alice (Bob) takes particles 3 from each state in SA (SB) to form
an ordered particle sequence SA3 (S
B
3 ){
SA3 = [P
A3
1 , P
A3
2 , . . . , P
A3
N ]
SB3 = [P
B3
1 , P
B3
2 , . . . , P
B3
N ].
(7)
For preventing eavesdropping, Alice (Bob) prepares a set of decoy photons
DA (DB) randomly in four nonorthogonal photon states {|0〉,|1〉,|+〉,|−〉}, and
inserts DA (DB) into the third photon sequence S
A
3 (S
B
3 ) at random positions
to form a new sequences SA∗3 (S
B∗
3 ). Then Alice and Bob exchange S
A∗
3 and
SB∗3 .
Step 2. After receiving SB∗3 (S
A∗
3 ), Alice (Bob) announces publicly her
(his) N initial asymmetric W states. If the initial state of Bob’s (Alice’s) is
|W ′1〉, Alice (Bob) will perform a Hadamard operation (see Eq. (1)) on the third
photon on her (his) hand; if the state is |W1〉, they do nothing. To guarantee the
security of the quantum channel, Alice (Bob) will perform the eavesdropping
check. The checking procedure of Alice-Bob quantum channel is: (i) Alice
informs Bob the positions and the measurement bases of the decoy photons.
(ii) Bob performs single-photon measurement and publishes his measurement
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outcomes. (iii) Alice analyzes the error rate, if the error rate is higher than the
threshold they preset, she aborts the protocol and restarts from the preparing
step; otherwise, the quantum channel of Alice-Bob is secure. On the same
time, Bob utilizes the same method to check security of Bob-Alice quantum
channel.
Step 3. Alice (Bob) discards the decoy photons in SA∗3 (S
B∗
3 ) and makes
the Z-basis measurement on every photon of her (his) hand. The measurement
outcome of Alice’s (Bob’s) first and second photons in the ith W state is
denoted as MA1i (M
B1
i ), then the value of C
A1
i (C
B1
i ) can be computed as
follows,
CA1i (C
B1
i ) =
{
0, MA1i (M
B1
i ) = |00〉
1, MA1i (M
B1
i ) = |01〉 or |10〉.
(8)
And CB2i (C
A2
i ) can be gotten according to Alice’s (Bob’s) outcome of the third
photon MB2i (M
A2
i ),
CB2i (C
A2
i ) =
{
0, MB2i (M
A2
i ) = |0〉
1, MB2i (M
A2
i ) = |1〉.
(9)
Then, Alice (Bob) continue to calculate CAi = C
A1
i ⊕CB2i (CBi = CB1i ⊕CA2i ),
and denotes CA = (C
A
0 , C
A
1 , . . . , C
A
N−1) (CB = (C
B
0 , C
B
1 , . . . , C
B
N−1)).
Step 4. Alice (Bob) prepares an L-length random binary sequence C
′
A =
(CA
′
0 , C
A
′
1 , . . . , C
A
′
N−1) (C
′
B = (C
B
′
0 , C
B
′
1 , . . . , C
B
′
N−1)), where C
A
′
i , C
B
′
i ∈ {0, 1},
i = 0, 1, . . . , L − 1, After that, Alice (Bob) uses KAB to encrypt C ′A (C
′
B),
and sends the result E(C
′
A) (E(C
′
B)) to Bob (Alice). Having received E(C
′
B)
(E(C
′
A)), Alice (Bob) uses KAB to decrypt E(C
′
B) (E(C
′
A)) and gets C
′
B (C
′
A).
Then Alice inserts C
′
A into CA at random positions to obtain a new sequence
named C
′′
A, she also records the inserted positions sequence Sq. Then Alice uses
KAB to encrypt Sq and sends the result E(Sq) to Bob. Bob decrypt E(Sq) to
get Sq, and inserts C
′
B into CB in terms of Sq for getting C
′′
B . Subsequently,
Alice and Bob use KAT , KBT to encrypt C
′′
A, C
′′
B , get E(C
′′
A), E(C
′′
B), and
send them to TP, respectively.
Step 5. TP decrypts E(C
′′
A), E(C
′′
B) by using KAT , KBT , and gets C
′′
A,
C
′′
B. Then he calculates R
′
=
∑N−1
i=0 (C
A
i ⊕CBi )+
∑L−1
i=0 (C
A
′
i ⊕CB
′
i ), and sends
R
′
to Alice and Bob, respectively.
Step 6. After receiving C
′
A, C
′
B , R
′
, Alice and Bob calculate R = R
′ −∑L−1
i=0 (C
A
′
i ⊕ CB
′
i ), respectively. If R = 0, Alice and Bob will know X = Y ;
otherwise, they get X 6= Y .
An example is given for better understanding the presented protocol. Sup-
pose that the ith secret inputs of binary representations of X and Y are ‘0’
and ‘0’. The asymmetric W state of Alice (Bob) prepared is |W1〉 (|W ′1〉).
After performing unitary operations and the Hadamard operation, |W1〉 and
|W ′1〉 evolve to a same state |W 1〉0 = 12 (|100〉+ |010〉+
√
2|001〉). so CA1i = 1,
CB2i = 0, C
B1
i = 1, C
A2
i = 0 can be calculated according to the single-particle
measurement outcomes. Thus, CAi = C
A1
i ⊕ CB2i = 1, CBi = CB1i ⊕ CA2i = 1,
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Ri = C
A
i ⊕CBi = 1⊕1 = 0. According to Ri, Alice and Bob know that xi = yi.
For i = 0 to N − 1, Alice and Bob use same method to compare whether xi,
yi are equal or not. In Tabel 1, we give all different cases of xi, yi’s values in
the proposed QPCE protocol.
Table 1: All different cases of xi, yi’s values
xi yi M
A1
i
MB2
i
MB1
i
MA2
i
CA1
i
CB2
i
CB1
i
CA2
i
CA
i
CB
i
Ci
0 0 |01〉or|10〉 |0〉 |01〉or|10〉 |0〉 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
|01〉or|10〉 |1〉 |00〉 |0〉 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
|00〉 |0〉 |01〉or|10〉 |1〉 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
|00〉 |1〉 |00〉 |1〉 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 |01〉or|10〉 |1〉 |01〉or|10〉 |0〉 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
|01〉or|10〉 |0〉 |00〉 |0〉 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
|00〉 |0〉 |00〉 |1〉 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
|00〉 |1〉 |01〉or|10〉 |1〉 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 |01〉or|10〉 |0〉 |01〉or|10〉 |1〉 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
|00〉 |0〉 |01〉or|10〉 |0〉 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
|00〉 |1〉 |00〉 |0〉 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
|01〉or|10〉 |1〉 |00〉 |1〉 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
1 1 |01〉or|10〉 |1〉 |01〉or|10〉 |1〉 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
|01〉or|10〉 |0〉 |00〉 |1〉 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
|00〉 |1〉 |01〉or|10〉 |0〉 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
|00〉 |0〉 |00〉 |0〉 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 Security Analysis
The proposed protocol holds the same security as the LWJ11 and LWG12
protocols, and it is secure against the well-known attacks (e.g., intercept-resend
attack, measurement-resend attack, and entanglement-measure attack, etc.).
Moreover, the protocol can avoid the flaw of information leak pointed out by
Li et al., and ensure TP cannot get comparison result. Here, we just have a
brief analysis on these two aspects.
(1) The information leak Li et al. pointed out can be avoided
Without loss of generality, we suppose that Bob is a dishonest participant
who attempts to obtain Alice secret inputs. The only way for Bob is to use
the third particles of Alice’s asymmetric W states (i.e., SA3 ) sent to him. The
detailed description is as follows,
In Step 1, Alice prepares |W1〉 = 12 (|100〉 + |010〉 +
√
2|001〉)123, |W ′1〉 =
1
2
(|10+〉+ |01+〉+√2|00−〉)123 randomly. For simplicity, we take the first state
|W1〉 as an example. After Alice’s encoding operation on the third particle,
|W1〉 evolves |W 1〉0 or |W 1〉1 in terms of Alice’s secret inputs.{ |W 1〉0 = 12 (|100〉+ |010〉+√2|001〉)123 xi = 0
|W 1〉1 = 12 (|101〉+ |011〉+
√
2|000〉)123 xi = 1. (10)
As specified in Step 3, Bob will perform a single-particle measurement on the
third particle. As shown in Eq. (10), if Bob can deduce the final state is |W 1〉0
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or |W 1〉1, he will know the Alice secret input (xi = 0 or xi = 1). At the same
time, the reduced density operator of Bob’s photon is
ρB0 = tr12(
|100〉+ |010〉+√2|001〉
2
⊗ 〈100|+ 〈010|+
√
2〈001|
2
)
=
1
2
|0〉〈0|+ 1
2
|1〉〈1| =
[
1
2
0
0 1
2
]
xi = 0
(11)
ρB1 = tr12(
|101〉+ |011〉+√2|000〉
2
⊗ 〈101|+ 〈011|+
√
2〈000|
2
)
=
1
2
|0〉〈0|+ 1
2
|1〉〈1| =
[
1
2
0
0 1
2
]
xi = 1
(12)
To estimate Alice’s ith private bit, Bob must estimate whether the system
in his possession is described by ρB0 or ρ
B
1 . Using the optimal measurement
[22, 23], the maximum probability that Bob estimates Alice’s ith private bit
correctly is
Pmax =
1
2
+
1
4
Tr|ρB0 − ρB1 | =
1
2
(13)
where |ρB0 − ρB1 | =
√
(ρB0 − ρB1 )†(ρB0 − ρB1 ), and (ρB0 − ρB1 )† is the Hermitian
conjugate of the (ρB0 − ρB1 ) matrix. That is, Bob can estimate Alice’s private
bit successfully with 1/2 probability. For instance, if MA2i is |0〉, Bob would
guess xi = 0 with the 1/2 probability; if M
A2
i is |1〉, he would guess xi = 1
with the 1/2 probability, too. That means, Bob cannot get Alice’s secret inputs
by measuring the third particles SA3 . So, in our protocol, there is no flaw of
information leak presented in Ref.[19]
(2) TP cannot know the comparison result
As analyzed in Section 2.2, the only chance for TP to know the comparison
result is to get the mix-up sequences C
′
A, C
′
B or the inserted positions sequence
Sq. In our scenario, these sequences C
′
A, C
′
B and Sq are encrypted by the QKD
key (KAB), which is only shared with Alice and Bob. And the QKD protocol
has already been proven to be unconditionally secure [24, 25], that means,
none can get any information about C
′
A, C
′
B and Sq.
Let us check the feasibility of two possible ways for TP to gain the com-
parison result. (1) TP tries to intercept C
′
A and C
′
B from the public channel
between Alice and Bob, then calculates R
′′
=
∑L−1
i=0 (C
A
′
i ⊕ CB
′
i ), and finally
gets the result by calculating R = R
′ − R′′ . However, in our new protocol,
C
′
A and C
′
B are encrypted into E(C
′
A), E(C
′
B) by using the QKD key (KAB)
before they are sent to the counterpart through the public channel. So, TP
cannot get C
′
A and C
′
B from E(C
′
A) and E(C
′
B), and then he cannot calculate
the result of R
′′
, that means TP will not get the comparison result R. (2) TP
attempts to get rid of the mix-up sequence C
′
A and C
′
B according to the posi-
tion sequence Sq, gets CA and CB, and then calculates R =
∑N−1
i=0 (C
A
i ⊕CBi ).
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This attack strategy does not work either. As described in Step 4 of our pro-
tocol, “Alice uses (KAB) to encrypt Sq and sends the result E(Sq) to Bob”.
That means TP cannot get Sq, and undoubtedly he cannot obtain the result
R. In summary, our protocol can prevent TP from knowing the comparison
result.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Up to now, many QPCE protocols based on maximally entangled states (e.g.,
Bell state, GHZ state, GHZ-like state) have been proposed. Comparing with
the maximally entangled states, the non-maximally entangled states (e.g., W
state, cluster state, χ-type state) have the stronger non-classicality, and they
are more robust against particle losses than the corresponding maximally en-
tangled states. Moreover, since we can directly use these non-maximally entan-
gled states and do not need to distill maximally entangled states from them,
it is more convenient and economical in the practical experiment. From the
perspective of the robustness and the physical implementation, using the non-
maximally entangled state as the quantum resource to design QPCE protocol
may be a best choice.
To guarantee the security of quantum channel, the eavesdropping checking
is indispensable. As we all know, there are two common methods, the first
is to utilize the correlation of entangled states, and the second is to use the
decoy photons. In the LWJ11 protocol, they utilize the W states to perform
eavesdropping checking, while decoy photons are used to replace W states
for eavesdropping checking in the LWG12 protocol. From the view of qubit
efficiency, using decoy photons to perform eavesdropping checking is obviously
better than using entangled states. Similar to the LWG12 protocol, we choose
the decoy photons to check the channel security. On the other hand, many
QPCE protocols, including the LWJ11 and LWG12 protocols, adopt the QKD
method to enhance the security of quantum private comparison. Undoubtedly,
this will cost more quantum resource, but it is the price we have to pay for
the higher safety requirements.
In this paper, based on the asymmetricW state |W1〉 and the QKD encryp-
tion method, a new secure QPCE protocol is proposed. Compared with other
analogous protocols, it not only holds the same security as that in Ref. [18],
but also can avoid the information leak pointed out in Ref. [19]. In addition,
the protocol can ensure that TP cannot know the comparison result. On the
other hand, the protocol inherits the efficiency of W state, which is discussed
in Ref. [18]. What is more, TP is only to do some exclusive-OR operations,
the two participants are only required to perform the simpler single-particle
measurement, which is more economical and feasible to be implemented within
present technologies. Our two-party protocol is a simple QPCE model, which
can be generalized to the case of multi-party and be extended to solve the
Yao’s millionaires’ problem.
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